Panel on Merger Control and Antitrust in the Middle East and Africa
Special Thanks To Our
Event Contributors

Dr. Nicholas Bremer
Moderator
Nicolas advises on regulatory M&A - including merger control, FDI, and transaction related financial regulations — as well as antitrust in the MENA region as well as under regional regimes in Africa including COMESA, ECOWAS, and EAC. He leads Bremer's Antitrust & Merger Control team and oversees the firm's Riyadh and Cairo offices.

Dr. Willard Mwemba
Panelist
Dr. Willard Mwemba is Director and CEO of the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission, leading enforcement of competition and consumer protection laws across the region. He previously headed merger control in both COMESA and Zambia and has played a key role in shaping regional competition regimes.
On 25 March 2026 alongside the ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting BREMER hosted a discussion with Dr. Willard Mwemba, the CEO of the COMESA Competition and Consumer Commission (CCCC). Dr. Mwemba provided insights into the evolving authorities of the CCCC with a more pronounced consumer protection mandate, the new mandatory and suspensory merger control regime, new provisions specifically addressing the digital economy, and stronger enforcement regime established with the COMESA Competition and Consumer Protection Regulations, 2025, which entered into force in December 2025.
Dr. Mwemba explained that with the implementation of the 2025 Regulations the COMESA merger control regime moved from a voluntary to a mandatory and suspensory regime. Derogations are narrow. Early implementation in possibly only in specific circumstances such as public bids, and certain securities transaction and only with the prior approval of the CCC. Furthermore, the 2025 Regulations introduced specific notification thresholds for digital mergers based on global transaction value. These aim to capture transactions that while not meeting the local notification thresholds potentially have substantial impact on competition. Furthermore, the 2025 Regulations authorize the CCC to consider public interest considerations such as implications of the transaction on the environment, and sustainability. Following questions from the audience Dr. Mwemba clarified that some aspects relating to public interest considerations and their role in merger control review remain unsettled. Competition concerns remain the primary standard on which transactions are evaluated. Public interest considerations only server as a secondary assessment parameter. Still, what remains unsettled is how a situation would be treated where a transaction has positive public interest effects in one and negative public interest effects in a different COMESA Member State.
On reforms of the COMESA behavioral antitrust regime Dr. Mwemba highlighted the focus on the digital economy. In particular, certain platforms that act as gatekeepers will be under higher scrutiny. Also, certain practices such as price parity clauses, engaging in self-preferencing—especially for platform businesses, utilization of user data, and restrictions on data portability are of increased interest of the CCCC. To support the CCCC’s oversight of conduct the 2025 Regulations also introduce new investigative authorities. The CCCC is now explicitly authorized to conduct market studies. Furthermore, the 2025 Regulations include provisions regulating dawn raids. These authorize national competition authorities to obtain court warrants and conduct inspections together with CCCC staff. Finally, the CCCC is now authorized to impose interim measures to prevent irreparable harm.
The 2025 Regulations also substantially amended the enforcement regime. Under the new regime the CCCC now has the authority to settle violations. Settlement will require the parties to pay a settlement fee and comply with instructions of the CCCC to amend or cease certain conduct. However, parties do not have to admit guilt or liability. The settlement regime is expressly coordinated at the COMESA and national level, to ensure that leniency granted by the CCCC is recognized by Member States and shields applicants from follow-on prosecutions by national authorities. Where violations are more severe the CCCC can seek fines of up to 10 percent of the violating parties’ COMESA wide annual revenue.
